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. J| Notice 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapo-
lis Quarterly Review replaces the Ninth 
District Quarterly (its last issue was in 
Spring 1977). As this first issue illustrates, 
the new publication will primarily present 
economic research aimed at improving 
policy making by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem and other governmental authorities. 
All Ninth District Quarterly readers will 
automatically receive the Quarterly Re-
view. Address questions or comments to: 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Minneapolis, MN 55480 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review vol. 1, No. 1 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Arthur J. 
Rolnick, Senior Economist, and Kathleen S. Rolfe, Editor/ 
Writer and Visuals Specialist. Graphics assistance pro-
vided by Phil Swenson and Karen Sizer, Graphic Services 
Department. 
Address requests for additional copies to the Research 
Department, Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota 55480. 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the 
Research Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and 
not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Bank Regulation: Strengthening 
Friedman's Case for Reform* 
Arthur J. Rolnick 
Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
In 1959 Milton Friedman proposed that the 
government free commercial banking from all 
regulation except a 100 percent reserve require-
ment on demand deposits.
1 He supported this 
proposal with a critical review of U.S. govern-
ment involvement in banking up to that time. 
The increased aggressiveness of the banking 
industry since then lends further support to 
Friedman's proposal. 
Are current regulations efficient? 
Government regulation of commercial banking 
is now based on two generally accepted objec-
tives. The government should control the supply 
of a medium of exchange, part being fiat money 
(money the issuer does not promise to convert 
into anything) and part being a safe bank liabil-
ity. It should also prevent anticompetitive mar-
ket practices in commercial banking. 
Preventing anticompetitive activities in all 
sectors of our economy has long been an ac-
cepted role of government. But controlling the 
supply of money while insuring a bank liability 
has only recently become a policy objective. 
Since existing regulations were not necessarily 
designed to meet this objective, they may not 
be the most efficient possible. 
Attempts to regulate banking began very 
early in this country. After much political and 
economic turmoil over two central bank experi-
ments, however, in 1836 the federal govern-
ment stopped regulating banks. From 1836 to 
*An early version of this article appeared in the 
EXECUTIVE, Cornell University, Graduate School of Bus-
iness and Public Administration, Winter 1977, pp. 54-6. 
1863, the U.S. banking system was just private 
banks operating under widely diverse state 
laws. 
The public eventually came to consider this 
system unsafe and unsound, so in 1864 Con-
gress passed the National Banking Act. This act 
created national banks that would issue safe 
and uniform currency. To insure safety, nation-
al banks were to be examined and supervised 
by the comptroller of the currency, and they 
were subject to capital requirements, various 
loan regulations, and reserve requirements 
against their notes. 
By the turn of the century, the public was 
again questioning the safety of the banking sys-
tem. The banking panic of 1907 intensified the 
country's 1907-8 economic recession. During 
that time most banks stopped converting depos-
its into currency. In response to this crisis, Con-
gress established the National Monetary Com-
mission. The commission's 1910 report was the 
basis for the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
This act gave the Federal Reserve System 
several responsibilities. One of the most signifi-
cant was the authority to issue and control the 
stock of its own liability, Federal Reserve notes. 
Another was to regulate this money, through 
the Fed's discount window, so that it would fluc-
tuate with the varying needs of the economy. 
The Fed also could impose a fixed reserve re-
quirement on all its member banks and could 
1 Milton Friedman, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1959). 
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supervise and examine them. (Only national 
banks were required to join the system; others 
could join voluntarily.) And in order to prevent 
financial panics, the Fed was to be the commer-
cial bankers' lender of last resort. 
The establishment of the Federal Reserve 
may have given the public the impression that 
bank liabilities were reasonably safe and backed 
in some way by the lender-of-last-resort power. 
But less than two decades later, the United 
States faced another major banking crisis when 
the Fed could not or would not meet its obliga-
tions. Unexpectedly, during 1930-33 two sepa-
rate banking panics occurred in which more 
than 9,000 banks closed, almost as many as in 
the preceding 100 years. The stock of money 
(currency plus demand deposits) decreased 
more than 30 percent. 
In response to both the great increase in 
bank failures and the steep decline in the stock 
of money and in an effort to finally provide a 
truly safe bank liability, Congress established 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) in 1933. The FDIC was to insure the first 
$5,000 of each deposit account in a member 
bank, charging a small annual premium based 
on the volume of deposits.
2 Although the law 
required only deposits in national banks to be 
insured, in time virtually all commercial banks 
became members of the FDIC. 
The FDIC seems to have worked. Since its 
establishment, fewer than 700 banks have 
failed and no financial panics have occurred. 
Simply insuring deposits seems to have done 
what the National Banking Act and the Federal 
Reserve Act were supposed to do through their 
examinations, reserve and capital require-
ments, and lender-of-last-resort backing. 
But could insurance have done it alone? 
Would FDIC deposit insurance have kept the 
banking industry stable without government-
imposed bank examinations, capital and reserve 
requirements, and other forms of government 
regulation? No, not as long as the FDIC 
charged a flat-rate premium based on the 
amount of deposits a bank held rather than the 
amount of risk it took. Profit-maximizing insur-
ance companies consider risk a major operat-
ing cost; not to do so encourages risk-taking at 
the expense of the insurer. Hence, government 
examinations and regulations are needed to 
control the hazard in banking encouraged by 
flat-rate premiums. 
Government insurance plus just the right 
amount of government examination and regula-
tion appears, then, to have stabilized banking, 
significantly reduced bank failures, and pro-
duced a safe bank liability. So why the need for 
reform? Why tamper with a system that seems 
to be working? 
The Case for Reform 
In 1959 Friedman examined the U.S. banking 
system and its history and pointed out two criti-
cal weaknesses. Government intervention into 
bank lending and investing was extensive. And 
the fractional reserve system was complicating 
the Federal Reserve's job of controlling the 
stock of money by making the public's decision 
about how to hold money affect the amount 
available to be held. 
Since 1959 another argument has surfaced, 
one implicit in Friedman's writing though not 
exploited. The FDIC insurance scheme requires 
extensive government intervention in activities 
he felt should be left completely to the market. 
But even if we don't oppose intervention, how 
do we know how much is really necessary? The 
flat-rate premium encourages risk-taking, so 
bank regulations must be designed to offset 
this behavior, which has increased dramatically 
since Friedman wrote. But how much risk-
taking should we allow? And how much regula-
tion does that require? 
Today's network of regulators and regula-
tions is already large and unwieldy. Five dis-
tinct government institutions enforce a multi-
tude of restrictions on banking activities. Com-
missioners charter, examine, and supervise 
^oday most accounts are insured up to $40,000; state and local govern-
ment deposits, up to $100,000. 
12 state banks in their areas. The comptroller of 
the currency does the same for national banks. 
The Federal Reserve also examines and super-
vises all national banks and those state banks 
that are members; the FDIC examines and su-
pervises most nonmember state banks. And the 
Department of Justice intervenes when issues 
related to monopoly practices are involved. 
These institutions enforce capital and reserve 
requirements, interest-rate limits on certain 
liabilities, and restrictions on the kind and 
amount of assets banks can hold in their port-
folios. 
Despite this extensive body of regulators 
and regulation, the banking industry seems to 
have become more aggressive. Some are even 
worried that it has already taken on too much 
risk.
3 Their major concerns are growth in bank 
liability management and holding company af-
filiation (see charts.) 
Liability management refers to banks ac-
tively seeking deposit liabilities by, for ex-
ample, issuing certificates of deposit (CDs) or 
borrowing federal funds from other banks. Be-
cause these liabilities are not fully insured, 
banks may be more vulnerable to losing such 
funds during periods of financial difficulties.
4 
And as the chart shows, the growth in these lia-
bilities has been quite dramatic since 1970. 
The growth in bank holding company affilia-
tion has also increased significantly since 1970. 
Through corporations like these, banks can get 
involved in nontraditional and possibly risky ac-
tivities. Bank holding companies today are 
doing such things as issuing credit cards; un-
derwriting life, accident, and health insurance; 
acting as dealers in banker's acceptances and 
brokers for credit extensions; and issuing bank-
3A leading advocate of this position is Hyman P. Minsky. See his "Finan-
cial Resources in a Fragile Environment," CHALLENGE, July-August 
1975, pp. 6-13. 
4Federal funds are not insured by the FDIC while most CDs are insured 
only up to $40,000. For a discussion of the implications of liability manage-
ment on bank failures see R. Alton Gilbert, "Bank Failures and Public 
Policy," REVIEW, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 1975, pp. 
7-15. 
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related commercial paper.
5 
How should the government respond to 
banks' increased aggressiveness in the face of 
so much regulation? Several economists and 
legislators advocate even more regulation. 
Others recognize that flat-rate insurance premi-
ums encourage risky behavior and argue for a 
variable rate scheme. Some simply want more 
and tighter government surveillance. 
To argue for any of these, however, we first 
need to know how much risk is too much, and 
how can we determine that? Finding just the 
right amount of regulation is therefore difficult, 
if not impossible. We simply have no way of 
knowing what is an acceptable level of risk and 
how much regulation that requires. 
Following Friedman's suggestion, however, 
we could require all banks to maintain 100 per-
cent reserves against a bank liability; that is, 
make each bank set aside at the Federal Re-
serve (or in its own vaults) enough money to 
pay all its demand depositors. We could then 
drop all other government regulations, includ-
ing reserve requirements on other liabilities, 
capital requirements, interest rate ceilings, 
restrictions on asset holdings, government in-
surance, and government-imposed bank exam-
inations, except those to enforce the 100 per-
cent reserve requirement. 
This proposal clearly meets the govern-
ment's main objective for bank regulation: the 
supply of money could still be controlled and 
the bank liability would be safe. In case of bank-
ruptcy, a bank's other creditors could not claim 
any reserve assets except those exceeding de-
mand deposits. The proposal avoids, further-
more, the problems inherent in an FDIC insur-
ance scheme. The government would not need 
to know how much risk to allow in banking. As 
in other industries, that would be determined 
by the preference of individual investors. 
Will it work? 
Is this one of those simple plans that may work 
in theory but not in practice? Isn't banking a 
complex business requiring complex regula-
tions? Won't unregulated banks take on "too 
much" risk, induce bank panics, and destabi-
lize our economy? 
A plan is good in theory only if it is good in 
practice. Whether banks will incur more or less 
risk under this alternative system is unclear 
and in a sense irrelevant. The important point 
is that banks will take on only as much risk as 
their stockholders and depositors (other than 
those holding fully backed deposits) are willing 
to bear. 
Some people may argue that unregulated 
banking activities will surely cause panics like 
those of the early 1930s. But existing regula-
tions such as reserve and capital requirements 
and bank examinations did not prevent those 
crises. 
In fact, several economists have persuasive-
ly argued that those panics were mostly caused 
by a government policy that promised but failed 
to provide a safe bank liability. And under the 
100 percent plan, government's role as an in-
suring agent would be explicit. In effect, only 
the fully backed deposits would be insured. For 
other deposits, banks would be left on their own 
with stockholders and depositors bearing the 
risk and sharing the profits. 
Conclusion 
In proposing this program in 1959, Friedman 
argued that the shift from the current system to 
100 percent reserves could be accomplished 
easily and quickly without any serious repercus-
sions in financial or economic markets. Today, 
after nearly 20 more years of trying to regulate 
an increasingly aggressive banking industry, 
the case for that shift is even stronger. 
5Holding companies do permit banks to diversify their activities, which 
may increase—not decrease—the soundness of the banking industry. For a 
discussion of both sides of the holding company issue and a look at the 
empirical evidence see Dale S. Drum, "Nonbanking Activities of Bank 
Holding Companies," ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, March/April 1977, pp. 12-21. 
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